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1 Introduction
Within the European Union, the application of value added tax in postal services
is a matter for the government of the member state. The state is required under
the European Directive to ensure the provision of the universal postal service. The
incumbent national postal operator provides the universal service provider (USP) as
the daily collection and delivery of mail throughout the state which, in most cases,
applies through geographically uniform tari¤s. As such the incumbent national postal
operator has an obligation to provide the universal service that requires it to commit
to the provision of a national network. In most countries, the incumbent national
postal operator has been a monopolist, owned by the government and exempt from
value added tax for the provision of the postal services. In some countries within
Europe the postal market has been opened up to competition so that the national
postal operator is no longer a monopolist of postal services within the state and in
some countries the national postal operator has transferred from public to private
ownership. The application of value added tax for postal services in the presence of
such change is important in understanding the development of the postal markets in
Europe.
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yToulouse School of Economics (GREMAQ-CNRS and IDEI). Corresponding author: de-
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The application of value added tax is of interest because either the postal operator
or customer may be VAT exempt or VAT rated. For the postal operator, if it is
exempt from charging value added tax (VAT) on postal services it is unable to
recover VAT they pay on inputs so these unrecovered tax payments enter their cost
base in forming the prices of their postal services. On the other hand, if a postal
operator is required to charge VAT on the postal services they o¤er they are rated
for VAT purposes and are able to recover input tax. Similarly for the customer, if
it is exempt from value added tax (VAT) on the goods and services it provides to
others it is unable to recover the VAT it pays on inputs and, on the other hand, if it
is VAT rated and charges VAT on its services then it can recover the VAT charges
on its inputs such as postal services it purchases from providers of such services.
This means that the tax incidence and prices di¤er depending on whether the postal
operator and customer is VAT exempt or VAT rated.
In this paper we explore some of the issues relating to the application of value
added tax under alternative objective functions, initially where the incumbent is a
monopolist that is VAT exempt and has some customers that are VAT exempt and
other customers that are VAT rated. We then consider the case where the incumbent
is a monopolist that is VAT rated and has some customers that are VAT exempt
and other customers that are VAT rated. Finally, we consider the cases where an
incumbent who is VAT exempt or VAT rated operates in a market that is open to
competition in the provision of some upstream services, through entrants accessing
the incumbents downstream services. In addition to the tax incidence and prices,
we also consider the welfare implications of these various cases.
In our model the national operator o¤ers two end-to-end (E2E) products: a single
piece product and a business mail product. The business mail product is o¤ered to
both VAT-rated and VAT exempt customers. The entrant, when introduced, acts as
a competitive fringe o¤ering a bulk mail product that is an (imperfect) substitute to
the bulk mail o¤ered by the national operator. The national operator also sells access
to its delivery areas to this entrant so that the national operator sells an intermediate
good as well as the two end-to-end products. While the national operator is either
VAT rated or VAT exempt, the entrant is assumed to be VAT rated throughout.
As such the model for this paper develops that of De Donder (2006) to explore the
issues of value added tax within postal services.
The paper proceeds as follows. Our model is set out further in section 2, rst
for the monopoly case and then when bulk mail is opened to competition. Section 3
calibrates the model. Section 4 presents, for the monopolist and entrant cases, some
numerical results for the second best welfare maximising case and, by contrast, a
case with the minimum single piece price that enables the national operator to break
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even (Panzar 2004). Section 5 concludes.
2 The model
We rst describe the model when the national postal operator (NPO) has monopoly
before moving to the case where it faces competition on the bulk mail market.
2.1 Monopoly case
In this section, there is a single NPO (with variables are denoted with the superscript
I) that o¤ers both single-piece mail (whose quantity is denoted by x) and bulk mail
(whose quantity is denoted by yI) to a single delivery area. We denote by q the
before-tax price of single piece mail and by pI the before-tax price of bulk mail.
There is a single VAT rate paid on all goods (non-labor inputs and outputs) which
is denoted by t. We will consider both the case where the NPO is VAT exempt and
where it is VAT rated.
The demand for single-piece mail is assumed to be independent from the demand
for bulk mail. All customers of single-piece mail are VAT exempt. In the case where
the NPO is also VAT exempt, their demand for single-piece mail is given by x(q).
If the NPO is VAT rated, their demand is x(q(1 + t)). We distinguish two kinds of
bulk-mail customers: those who are VAT-rated (denoted with subscript R) and those
who are not (subscript NR). VAT exempt buyers care about the after-tax price of
the good while the VAT rated ones care about the before-tax price (because they
reclaim the VAT they pay on this good, which is an input in their own production
function). The postal operator charges the same before-tax price pI to the two types
of customers. The total demand for NPO bulk mail is given by
yI(pI) = yIR(p
I) + yIN(p
I(1 + t))
if the NPO is VAT rated, and by
yI(pI) = yIR(p
I) + yIN(p
I)
if not.
The NPO faces three kinds of costs: xed costs, upstream costs and delivery
costs. The xed cost is denoted by F , with a fraction F that is non-labor costs,
i.e. on which the NPO pays VAT. We denote by cx (resp., cIy) the constant marginal
upstream cost for single-piece mail (resp., bulk mail), and we assume that cx > cIy:
We denote by dI the constant marginal delivery cost for both single-piece and bulk
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mail. Finally, I denotes the fraction of the upstream and delivery costs that is
non-labor, i.e. on which the NPO pays VAT.
The costs faced by the NPO depend on its VAT status. The NPO pays VAT on
its non-labor input whatever its VAT status. If the NPO is VAT exempt, it does
not charge VAT to its customers and can not reclaim the VAT paid on inputs. If
the NPO is VAT rated, it charges VAT to its customers and reclaims the VAT it has
paid on inputs. In the case the NPO is VAT exempt (denoted with a subscript N),
its cost of providing x units of single-piece mail and yI units of bulk mail is denoted
by
CIN(x; y
I) = F (1 + F t) + (1 + 
It)
 
(cx + d
I)x+ (cIy + d
I)yI

where F tF is a xed amount of VAT paid by the NPO irrespective of its volume of
output of postal services while
tI
 
(cx + d
I)x+ (cIy + d
I)yI

measures the variable part of VAT the NPO pays.
On the other hand, if the NPO is VAT-rated, it can recoup the VAT paid on
inputs, and its cost function is given by
CIR(x; y
I) = F + (cx + d
I)x+ (cIy + d
I)yI :
We obviously have that
CIN(x; y
I) > CIR(x; y
I):
The (net of tax) NPOs prot is given by
IN(q; p
I) = qx(q) + pI

yIR(p
I) + yIN(p
I)
  CIN(x(q); yI(pI))
if the NPO is VAT exempt and
IR(q; p
I) = qx(q(1 + t)) + pI

yIR(p
I) + yIN(p
I(1 + t))

 CIR(x(q(1 + t)); yIR(pI) + yIN(pI(1 + t)))
if it is VAT rated. This illustrates the impact on NPOs prot of changing its VAT
status from exempt to rated, while keeping prices constant. On the output side,
this move decreases the amount demanded by single-piece buyers (who are all VAT
exempt) and by VAT exempt bulk mail customers (the other bulk mail customers
are not a¤ected since they reclaim the VAT they pay on inputs). This impact on
prot is thus negative. On the input side, the NPO can now reclaim the VAT it
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is paying on inputs. This impact on prot is positive. The sign of the net impact
is ambiguous and depends on demand elasticities: if the demand by VAT exempt
customers were totally inelastic, the rst impact would disappear and the net e¤ect
would be positive. The largest the demand elasticity of those customers, the lowest
is IR(q; p
I)  IN(q; pI).
We rst study a Ramsey-type objective for the social planner, who maximizes
total welfare in the postal economy subject to the NPO breaking even.1 Total welfare
is made o¤ consumer surplus, NPOs prot and VAT proceeds raised in the postal
sector. We assume that the planner values the VAT proceeds using an exogenous
cost of public funds, denoted by . With a VAT exempt NPO, the optimization
problem is
max
q;pI
WN = CSx(q) + CSN(p
I) + CSR(p
I) + IN(q; p
I) + (1 + )V ATN(q; p
I)
s.t. IN(q; p
I)  0; [Lagrange multiplier ]
where CSx(q) measures the net consumer surplus of single-piece mail buyers and
CSN() (resp., CSR()) measures the net consumer surplus of the VAT exempt (resp.,
VAT rated) bulk mail buyers. The parameter  is the Lagrange multiplier of the
NPO budget constraint and measures the shadow cost of this constraint in terms of
social welfare WN .
When the NPO is VAT exempt, the amount of VAT proceeds in the postal sector
is given by
V ATN(q; p
I) = tFF + t
I

(cx + d
I)x(q) + (cIy + d
I)
 
yIN(p
I) + yIR(p
I)

:
The FOC with respect to q is given by the Ramsey-like formula
q   (1 +  
1+
It)(cx + d
I)

q
=

1 + 
1
"x
;
where "x denotes the demand price elasticity of single-piece mail. The reader will
recognize the Ramsey rule, with the mark-up over marginal cost inversely propor-
tional to the price elasticity of demand. The relevant marginal cost is a function
of the parameters  and . If  =  1; the planner does not take into account tax
proceeds and the relevant marginal cost is the after-tax one for the rm. If  = 0
(zero cost of public funds), the tax part of the marginal cost is deated by =(1+):
If  = , the relevant marginal cost is the before-tax one, cx + dI , as the concerns
1See Auerbach and Hines (2001) for a general presentation of the economic impact of value
added taxation.
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for the NPO breaking even and the cost of public funds neutralize each other. Other
things equal, a larger value of  decreases the relevant marginal cost and thus calls
for a lower value of q, as intuitive (since a lower price boosts quantities and thus tax
proceeds, at the expense of NPOs prot).
The FOC for the bulk mail price is obtained similarly, but is more complex
because of the presence of two di¤erent kinds of customers.
When the NPO is VAT rated, the planners objective is given by
max
q;pI
WR = CSx(q(1 + t)) + CSN(p
I(1 + t)) + CSR(p
I) (1)
+IR(q; p
I) + (1 + )V ATR(q; p
I)
s.t. IR(q; p
I)  0; [Lagrange multiplier ]:
Now that the NPO is VAT rated, both single-piece mail customers and a fraction of
bulk mail customers (those who are not rated) pay VAT. As for VAT rated buyers
of bulk mail, they dont pay VAT themselves but rather charge VAT to their nal
customers. We make the simplifying assumption that the nal amount of VAT paid
by their nal customers is not a¤ected by the bulk mail price they pay.2 We then
have that
V ATR(q; p
I) = t

qx(q(1 + t)) + pIyIN(p
I(1 + t))

:
The FOC with respect to q is then given by
q
 
1 + 1+
1+
t
  (cx + dI)
q
=
+ t
1 + 
1
"x
;
which simplies to the usual Ramsey formula when t = 0 and to the Ramsey formula
in terms of after-tax price price q(1 + t) if  = : Intuitively, both  and  tend to
increase the optimal value of q, the former because of the strengthening of the NPO
budget constraint it implies, the latter because of the larger weight put on VAT
receipts.
In each case (NPO VAT rated or not), the Ramsey optimization program gen-
erates a pair of prices (q; pI) that are consistent with the NPO breaking even and
2This is the case for instance if postal services represent a small fraction of the inputs of bulk mail
buyers, so that their own output price is not a¤ected signicantly by variations in bulk mail price.
The alternative to this simplifying assumption would require us to model the demand function for
the nal goods and services sold by VAT-rated buyers of bulk mail. This would complicate the
model and introduce a further set of assumptions related to these demand functions.
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which in general are di¤erent to one another according to the VAT regime. There
of course exist other pairs of prices consistent with the NPO breaking-even. Among
these pairs, a particularly interesting one corresponds to the minimum value of the
single-piece mail price, since this price presents a particular interest for the planner
(see Panzar (2004)). The problem the planner solves in that case is to nd
min q such that Ii (q; p
I)  0; i = N;R (2)
and that pI  q   k;
where k is some preparation cost that bulk mail users have to incur. We assume
that, if the price di¤erence between bulk mail and single piece was not at least equal
to this preparation cost, the demand for bulk mail would drop to zero.
2.2 Competition with access only
In the second part of the paper, we introduce an entrant (denoted by E) that com-
petes with the NPO by o¤ering a bulk mail product to both VAT rated and VAT
exempt bulk customers. The bulk mail product o¤ered by the entrant is an (im-
perfect) substitute to the good provided by the NPO. The entrant is VAT rated: it
charges VAT to its customers and reclaims any VAT that it pays on its input. The
quantity of bulk mail sold by the entrant is denoted by yE. As we have seen with
the NPO monopolist, the demand by VAT rated customers depends on before-tax
prices. Denoting the entrants before-tax price for bulk mail by pE, we have that
the demand by VAT rated customers for NPO (resp., entrants) bulk mail is given
by yIR(p
I ; pE) (resp., yER(p
I ; pE)). The demand by VAT exempt customers depends
on after-tax prices. Assuming that the NPO is VAT exempt, we have demand func-
tions yIN(p
I ; pE(1 + t)) and yEN(p
I ; pE(1 + t)). In the case where the NPO is also
VAT rated, like the entrant, the demands are given by yIN(p
I(1 + t); pE(1 + t)) and
yEN(p
I(1+t); pE(1+t)). Total demand for NPO (resp., entrants) bulk mail is denoted
by yI(pI ; pE) (resp., by yE(pI ; pE)).
To summarize, we have that, if the NPO is VAT exempt,
yI(pI ; pE) = yIR(p
I ; pE) + yIN(p
I ; pE(1 + t));
yE(pI ; pE) = yER(p
I ; pE) + yEN(p
I ; pE(1 + t)):
while, if the NPO is VAT rated, we have
yI(pI ; pE) = yIR(p
I ; pE) + yIN(p
I(1 + t); pE(1 + t));
yE(pI ; pE) = yER(p
I ; pE) + yEN(p
I(1 + t); pE(1 + t)):
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As for costs, we assume that the entrant has no xed cost,3 a constant marginal
upstream cost of cE and is obliged to buy access to the NPO delivery network at a
constant (net of tax) unit cost (access charge) of a. One unit of bulk mail necessitates
one unit of access.
We assume that the entrant behaves like a competitive fringe. The before-tax
price charged by the entrant is then
pE = a+ cE:
Whether the NPO is VAT exempt has no direct impact on this price formula
since the entrant behaves like a competitive fringe, and since the truemarginal
cost of a VAT rated entrant is not a¤ected by whether the entrant has paid VAT on
(part of) its inputs.
We rst look at the case where the NPO is VAT exempt. Its total cost is given
by
CIN(x; y
I ; yE) = F (1 + F t) + (1 + 
It)

(cx + d
I)x
+(cIy + d
I)yI + dIyE

:
Its (net of tax) prot is then given by
IN(q; p
I ; pE) = qx(q) + pIyI(pI ; pE) + ayE(pI ; pE)
 CIN(x(q); yI(pI ; pE); yE(pI ; pE));
where yI(pI ; pE) = yIN(p
I ; pE(1 + t)) + yIR(p
I ; pE) and yE(pI ; pE) = yER(p
I ; pE) +
yEN(p
I ; pE(1 + t))
The (second-best) optimization problem is given by
max
q;pI ;a
WN = CSx(q) + CSN(p
I ; pE(1 + t)) + CSR(p
I ; pE)
+IN(q; p
I ; pE) + (1 + )V ATN(q; p
I ; pE)
s.t. IN(q; p
I ; pE)  0; [Lagrange multiplier ]
where CSN(pI ; pE(1+ t)) and CSR(pI ; pE) are net consumer surpluses when the two
types of bulk mail products are available at before-tax prices of pI and pE and where
3In the calibrations, we assume that the absence of xed costs for the entrant translates into
higher marginal (upstream and delivery) costs than for the NPO.
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the amount of VAT proceeds paid by VAT exempt agents is denoted by
V ATN(q; p
I ; pE) = tFF + t
I

(cx + d
I)x(q)
+(cIy + d
I)
 
yIN(p
I ; pE(1 + t)) + yIR(p
I ; pE)

+dI(yER(p
I ; pE) + yEN(p
I ; pE(1 + t)))

+tpEyEN(p
I ; pE(1 + t)):
We now turn to the case where the NPO is VAT rated. Its total cost is given by
CIR(x; y
I ; yE) = F + (cx + d
I)x+ cIyy
I + dI(yI + yE);
and its (net of tax) prot is
IR(q; p
I ; pE) = qx(q(1 + t)) + pIyI(pI ; pE) + ayE(pI ; pE)
 CIR(x(q(1 + t)); yI(pI ; pE); yE(pI ; pE));
with yI(pI ; pE) = yIN(p
I(1 + t); pE(1 + t)) + yIR(p
I ; pE) and yE(pI ; pE) = yER(p
I ; pE) +
yEN(p
I(1 + t); pE(1 + t)):
The Ramsey optimization problem of a VAT rated NPO is given by
max
q;pI ;a
WR = CSx(q(1 + t)) + CSN(p
I(1 + t); pE(1 + t))
+CSR(p
I ; pE) + IR(q; p
I ; pE) + (1 + )V ATR(q; p
I ; pE)
s.t. IR(q; p
I ; pE)  0 [Lagrange multiplier ];
with
V ATR(q; p
I) = t

qx(q(1 + t)) + pIyIN(p
I(1 + t); pE(1 + t)) + pEyEN(p
I(1 + t); pE(1 + t))

:
We will also consider the objective of minimizing the single-piece price q while
allowing the NPO to break-even, as dened in (2).
3 Calibration
Our calibration assumptions are the same as in De Donder et al. (2006), but without
distinction between delivery zones. Note that, as in that paper, the assumptions used
here do not represent the position in a particular NPO. Rather they are stylised and
applied to illustrate the e¤ects within the model given the complexity of analytical
solutions to the formal model set out in section 2. We start from the hypothetical
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situation where the VAT-exempt NPO does not face any entrants and posts a price
of 0.50e for the single-piece product and 0.40e for its bulk mail product. Total
quantities sold at those prices are, respectively, 2 billion and 8 billion items. We
assume that VAT-rated and VAT-exempt consumers have the same demand function
yIR(p
I) = yIN(p
I);
so that they both demand 4 billion items for a 0.40e bulk mail price. The direct
price elasticities are -0.2 for single-piece mail and -0.4 for bulk mail at these prices.
Finally, we calibrate linear demands based on these quantities, prices and elasticities.
We need further information to calibrate the demand functions for bulk mail
products when the market is opened to competition. We use two types of information:
the extent of entry for di¤erent price congurations and the substitutability between
the two bulk mail products for consumers. We assume that entrants would capture
10% of the total market for bulk mail if both bulk mail products had the same price
and 50% of the market if entrants were to o¤er a 20% price discount over the NPO.
As for substitution between those products, we assume that the displacement ratio
is set at 0.75 in both areas which means that three quarters of the quantities sold
by entrants are displaced from the NPO, while one quarter represents additional
volumes sold in the sector. We make the same assumptions for bulk mail demand
emanating from VAT rated and VAT exempt customers.
The NPO constant marginal upstream cost (before tax) is cx = 0:173e for single-
piece mail4 and cIy = 0:115e for bulk mail. The NPO constant marginal delivery
cost (for all kinds of mail), dI is 0.116e. The share of xed cost that is non-labor is
F = 0:4 while the corresponding fraction for variable costs is I = 0:2: The VAT
rate t is 20%. The (before tax) xed cost F equals 1.556bn e so that the PO breaks
even in the hypothetical monopoly situation (including a normal rate of prot, F
equals 40% of revenue of 4.2bn e). An entrant does not face any xed cost but
we assume that this results in higher variable upstream and delivery costs than the
NPO. Accordingly, an entrants before tax upstream cost, cE, is set at 0.144e, its
delivery cost at 0.183e.
4 Results
We rst look at the monopoly case before turning to the simulations with access-
based competition for the bulk mail product.
4This value corresponds to an after-tax cost of 0.18e (the value used in De Donder et al. (2006))
once a (t=20%) VAT rate has been imposed on the (I =20%) fraction of the upstream cost that
is non-labor.
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4.1 Monopoly case
Table 1 shows the results of the monopolist NPO. The rst three columns of gures
relate to the VAT exempt monopolist. The rst column shows the calibration used.
With no VAT applied to the NPO the pre and post tax prices are the same, at
0.50 Euro for the single piece and 0.40 Euro for the bulk mail piece. The calibration
assumptions correspond to the equi-proportional mark-up (EPMU) solution, with the
same mark-up over marginal cost posted for both the single-piece mail and bulk mail.
For these prices, 80% of volumes are bulk mail (40% from VAT exempt customers
and 40% for VAT rated ones), and the remaining 20% is single-piece mail. Given
the stylised assumptions used in the calibration set out in section 3, around 28% of
the NPOs costs are subject to VAT (this is a weighted average of the percentage of
non-labor xed costs, 40%, and of non-labor variable costs, 20%). No VAT is paid
by customers and the NPO pays VAT of 0.221m Euro through its input costs. Total
consumer surplus is 6.500m Euro, while the NPOs prot equals zero by construction.
The last row in the Table gives the value of the objective in (1), i.e. the sum of
customer surplus and of (1+) times VAT proceeds, with  = 0:3 being the exogenous
cost of public funds. This equals 6.788m Euro in the calibrated simulation.
[Insert Table 1 around here]
The second best welfare maximising results corresponding to program (1) are
shown in the second column of gures. Demand elasticity is larger for bulk mail
than for single-piece mail, so that Ramsey prices under program (1) are lower than
EPMU for the rst category of mail, and larger for the second. This remains true
even when we add to the Ramseys objective the weighted value of VAT proceeds.
The single piece price increases to 0.615 Euro, and its demand reduces from 2.00bn
items to 1.908bn. The bulk mail price reduces from 0.40 Euro to 0.371Euro, and its
demand increases from 8.00bn to 8.25bn items. The NPO pays VAT of 0.222m Euro
through its input costs. Single-piece customerssurplus decreases (compared to the
calibration allocation), while bulk mail customerssurplus increases. As expected
from the comparative nature of the two programs, the weighted sum of customers
surpluses and VAT proceeds increases (since this is what is maximized in this simu-
lation). Observe that total customers surplus is also higher than in the calibration
simulation.
The third column reports the solution of optimization problem (2). Observe
that the constraint that pI  q   k, with k = 0:06, is binding. The minimum
single piece mail price decreases to 0.469 Euro, and its demand increases to 2.025bn.
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Table 1:  Results of the monopolist NPO cases 
 
 VAT exempt NPO VAT rated NPO 
 Calibration Welfare 
maximising 
Minimum q Calibration – 
scaled down 
Welfare 
maximising 
Minimu
m q 
Single piece       
Pre-VAT price 0.500 0.615 0.469 0.478 0.573 0.450 
Post-VAT price 0.500 0.615 0.469 0.574 0.688 0.540 
Volume 2.000 1.908 2.025 1.941 1.850 1.968 
       
Bulk mail        
Pre-VAT price 0.400 0.371 0.409 0.382 0.359 0.390 
Post-VAT price 0.400 0.371 0.409 0.459 0.430 0.468 
Volume NR1 4.000 4.116 3.965 3.765 3.878 3.728 
Volume VR2 4.000 4.116 3.965 4.071 4.165 4.040 
       
Net VAT receipts 0.221 0.221 0.222 0.566 0.569 0.564 
Total consumer 
surplus and profit 
6.500 6.510 6.493 6.198 6.187 6.197 
Welfare 6.788 6.799 6.780 6.813 6.825 6.805 
 
 
 
Table 2:  Results of the NPO with Access Entry cases 
 
 VAT exempt NPO VAT rated NPO 
 Welfare 
maximising 
Minimum q Welfare 
maximising 
Minimum q 
Single piece     
Pre-VAT price 0.614 0.480 0.574 0.469 
Post-VAT price 0.614 0.480 0.689 0.562 
Volume 1.909 2.016 1.848 1.950 
     
Bulk mail      
Pre-VAT price 0.371 0.420 0.359 0.409 
Post-VAT price 0.371 0.420 0.431 0.490 
Volume NR3 4.117 3.793 3.528 2.460 
Volume VR4 3.643 2.548 3.529 2.639 
     
Entry     
Pre-VAT price 0.369 0.354 0.351 0.349 
Post-VAT price 0.442 0.425 0.421 0.418 
Volume NR5 0.000 0.172 0.463 1.571 
Volume VR6 0.633 1.832 0.845 1.768 
     
Access      
price 0.224 0.210 0.207 0.204 
     
Net VAT receipts 0.221 0.215 0.557 0.527 
Total consumer 
surplus and profit 
6.523 6.459 6.198 6.116 
Welfare 6.810 6.755 6.846 6.758 
 
                                                 
1 NR = non VAT rated or VAT exempt customers  
2 VR = VAT rated customers 
3 NR = non VAT rated or VAT exempt customers 
4 VR = VAT rated customers 
5 NR = non VAT rated or VAT exempt customers  
6 VR = VAT rated customers 
The bulk mail price increases to 0.409 Euro - consistent with a minimum margin of
0.060 Euro between the bulk mail and single piece price to recover the shortfall
from the lower single piece price; the bulk mail demand reduces to 7.93bn items,
split equally between VR and NR customers. The NPO pays VAT of 0.221m Euro
through its input costs, total consumer surplus and prot reduces to 6.493m Euro
and the total welfare reduces to 6.78m Euro. The welfare is marginally lower in this
case as the single piece price is set to a minimum value and results in the bulk mail
price increasing to reach breakeven.
The break even results involve a range of single piece prices between 0.469 Euro
and 0.615 Euro. However, no VAT is charged on these prices, nor the bulk mail
prices. VAT is only charged on the input to the NPO. As the combined volumes do
not change substantially, the VAT and welfare are reasonably stable over the break
even range of cases.
The nal three columns of gures in Table 1 relate to the VAT-rated monopolist.
Here the NPO charges VAT at an assumed rate of 20% on its services and reclaims
the VAT it pays on its inputs. At the (pre-tax) calibration prices of 0.5 Euro for
single piece and 0.4 Euro for bulk mail, the net impact for the NPOs prot of moving
to a VAT-rated status (as discussed on page 5) is positive. In order to compare with
the other columns of Table 1 (all of which having the NPO breaking even), we report
in the rst of the last three columns the results obtained when we scale down both
pre-tax prices by the same percentage compared to the calibrated values reported
in the rst numerical column. In this case the post-VAT prices for the single-piece
item is higher at 0.574 Euro and bulk mail at 0.459 Euro for NR customers, having
applied VAT at a rate of 20%. However for VR customers the e¤ective bulk mail
price decreases to 0.382 Euro as those customers can reclaim the VAT applied to
the price. Where the prices paid increase the demand reduces - to 1.94bn items for
single piece and from 4.00bn to 3.76bn items for VAT exempt bulk mail customers.
Volumes increase from 4.00bn to 4.07bn for VAT-rated customers of bulk mail. The
reduction in total volume reduces the NPOs input VAT but this is more than o¤set
by the VAT recovered through prices to yield net VAT receipts of 0.566bn Euro.
Relative to the calibration in the rst column of Table 1, total customer surplus is
much lower. The increase in (weighted) VAT receipts more than compensates for the
loss in total consumer surplus within the calibration.
The second best welfare maximising result for the VAT rated monopolist is shown
in the fth column of Table 1 and may be compared to the VAT exempt monopolist
in the second column. The post VAT single piece price of the VAT rated NPO at
0.688 Euro is 12% more than the single piece price of the VAT exempt NPO of 0.615
Euro - the single piece price increases less than the VAT rate of 20%. In other words,
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just over 60% of the tax is borne by consumers in the form of a higher after-tax price.
The combined e¤ect of the tax on both types of bulk mail customers jointly is
that less of the tax is shifted forward to bulk mail customers overall than in the
case of single piece customers. This is in line with economic theory in that, in a
perfectly competitive economy, the higher the elasticity of demand, the smaller the
fraction of a tax on transactions that is borne by customers. However, the position
is complicated by the di¤erent tax status of the two classes of bulk mail customers,
those that are VAT rated and those that are not, which results from them facing ,
inclusive of the tax, signicantly di¤erent e¤ective prices for bulk mail. VAT rated
customers, although charged the tax, actually face lower prices than without the
tax (by 3% from 0.371 Euro to 0.359 Euro). This unusual situation arises inter alia
because, rst, the cost base of the NPO is lowered by its ability to reclaim input
tax so helping to lower the pre-tax price and, secondly, that a VAT rated bulk mail
customer itself can reclaim as input tax the VAT levied by the NPO. By contrast,
for VAT exempt bulk mail customers the post VAT bulk mail price of the VAT rated
NPO at 0.430 Euro is 16% more than the bulk mail price of the VAT exempt NPO of
0.371 Euro. A larger percentage of the tax (80%) is borne by NR consumers of bulk
mail than by (NR) consumers of single piece mail. But the weighted average across
both types of bulk mail customers is just over 30%, less than single piece customers.
Comparison of the second and fth columns of Table 1 also shows that the total
consumer surplus and prot of the VAT exempt NPO at 6.510m Euro is signicantly
higher than that for the VAT rated NPO of 6.187m Euro. At the calibration values
set out in section 3, this means that VAT-rated bulk mail customers gain less than
what VAT-exempt customers lose from the change of VAT status of the NPO (both
single piece and bulk mail exempt customers lose). However, when VAT receipts are
added to the total consumer surplus and prot and multiplied by 1.3 to reect social
welfare, the welfare of the VAT exempt NPO at 6.799m Euro is marginally less than
that for the VAT rated NPO of 6.825m Euro. Under such assumptions, the movement
from a VAT exempt to VAT rated NPO would reduce the economic welfare of postal
consumers, but within the model framework this would be o¤set by the VAT receipts
to the VAT authority such that the welfare would be very marginally more in the
case of the VAT rated NPO for society as a whole at the cost of public funds assumed
of 0.3. Finally, the Lagrange multiplier of the NPOs zero-prot constraint is larger
than in Table 1, but remains smaller than the exogenous cost of public funds.
Moving to the minimum single-piece mail price consistent with the NPO breaking-
even, and comparing the third and sixth columns of Table 1, we obtain a second tax
incidence result, with roughly 75% of the 20% VAT rate borne directly by single-piece
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mail consumers in the form of a higher after-tax price. Note that the NPO can break-
even with smaller pre-tax prices when VAT rated because then it would be able, under
the alternative tax regime, to recover input tax. As they care only about pre-tax
prices, VAT-rated customers benet from this move, while VAT-exempt customers
su¤er from higher after-tax prices. Total surplus is lower than in the third column
of Table 1, but the sum of surplus and of weighted VAT proceeds is larger than in
the third column of Table 1.
4.2 Competition with access only
[Insert Table 2 around here]
Some of the results of the NPO o¤ering access entry are similar to those of the
monopolist NPO. The rst two columns of gures in Table 2 show the results of the
NPO o¤ering an access service to entrants for a VAT exempt NPO. The rst column
shows the welfare maximising results which for the single piece and bulk mail NR
customers are almost identical to those in column 2 of Table 1. However, in this case
the NPOs access service leads the entrant to undercut the NPOs bulk mail price
for VR customers, as these customers are able to recover the VAT charged by the
entrant. The VAT charged by the entrant cannot be recovered by the NR customers
and in this case the entrant price exceeds the NPOs bulk mail price. Some of the VR
customersvolumes transfer from the NPO to the entrant and the lower price o¤er
results in some overall growth in demand. This results in a marginal improvement in
total consumer and prot and total welfare for the welfare maximising access entry
case in column 1 of Table 2 relative to that of the NPO monopolist in column 2 of
Table 1.
The second column in Table 2 shows the minimum q with access entry and the
VAT exempt NPO. When compared to the third column in Table 1, the results of
minimum q in column 2 of Table 2 show higher single piece and bulk mail prices at
0.480 Euro and 0.420 Euro respectively. The price ranges within which break even
occur are slightly narrower in the presence of access entry and the di¤erence in total
consumer and prot and total welfare measures between the minimum q and welfare
maximising case increase with the access entry. The access price at 0.210 Euro in
this case is marginally lower than that in the welfare maximising case of column 1
in Table 2.
The last two columns of gures in Table 2 show the results of the NPO with
access entry for the VAT rated NPO. The rst of these columns shows the welfare
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maximising results which for the single piece customers are almost identical to those
in column 5 of Table 1 for the calibration reported in Section 3. For bulk mail
customers, the VR customers compare the pre-VAT prices of the NPO and entrant,
and the NR customer compares the post-VAT prices. In both cases the entrant
prices are less than the NPOs prices, and this leads to some of the NPOs volumes
for both the VR and NR customers to switch to the entrants. In this case the
volumes switching are similar for VR and NR customers, but more generally the
volume switch is greater where the price di¤erence between NPO and entrant is
greater.
Finally, for both the welfare maximising and minimum q case the access prices
are lower for the VAT rated NPO than the VAT exempt NPO. As with the NPO
monopolist cases, the move from VAT exempt to VAT rated status reduces the total
consumer surplus and prot, but increases the total welfare of the welfare maximising
case. Under our calibration assumptions, the movement from a VAT exempt to VAT
rated NPO would reduce the welfare of postal consumers, but this would be o¤set
by the VAT receipts to the VAT authority such that the welfare is marginally more
in the case of the VAT rated NPO for society as a whole.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we have looked at the e¤ects of the VAT status of the NPO and
customers on the incidence of tax and welfare. We have applied a model of two
goods single piece and bulk mail for a monopolist NPO and an NPO that o¤ers
access to entrants competing with the NPOs bulk mail good.
In our model, the after tax price of the VAT rated NPO increases by less than the
full amount of the VAT. Further we have shown that a move from a VAT exempt to a
VAT rated NPO benets the VAT rated bulk mail customers and the VAT authority.
Additionally, a move from a VAT exempt to a VAT rated NPO dis-benets the non
VAT rated bulk mail customers, the single piece customers and signicantly increases
the single piece price. Overall the consumer surplus and prot in the postal sector
is lower in the case of a VAT rated NPO, but this may be o¤set when the receipts
to the VAT authority are included and scaled within the total welfare measure.
Our model does not take account of the potential for VAT rated bulk mail cus-
tomers to create additional business and VAT receipts through reclaiming any VAT
on postal services and conversely for VAT exempt customers. This could be included
in the analysis as a further extension. Other areas of potential extension include
consideration of a budget constraint for government whereby the sum of prot and
VAT receipts is the same for both the VAT exempt and VAT rated NPO, di¤erent
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VAT rates for the di¤erent taxed elements or goods and alternative forms of entry
including full bypass of the NPOs network. Hence there is scope to develop the
models presented in this paper to explore further the consequences of alternative
VAT regimes within the postal sector.
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